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BIANNUAL SURVEY

defendant appealed from an order of the lower court which,
inter alia, denied his motion to conduct an examination of plaintiff
in New York County and ordered the examination to take place in
Kings County. The appellate division modified the order and
held that plaintiff's examination should take place in New York
County since a party who is subject to an examination in New
York City may be required to appear for the taking of his pretrial depositions in any of the counties of New York City.
Since the five counties of New York City cover a comparatively
small area and there is an abundance of convenient transportation
available, CPLR 3110 provides: "For the purposes of this rule
New York City shall be considered one county." Under former
law, a deponent residing or having an office in a county within
New York City could be compelled to attend an examination in
that county or the county where the action was pending.198 The
instant case makes it clear that under CPLR 3110 in order to
compel attendance of a party within any of the counties of New
York City, it is necessary only that he reside or have an office
within the city, or that the action be pending within the city.1 99
CPLR 3110 was intended to assist attorneys by permitting them
to notice examinations at their offices.200
In the event the
examining party should abuse the privilege of selecting a county
within the city by noticing an examination at an inconvenient
place in order to harass a party, a protective order may be obtained
under CPLR 3103(a).
ARTICLE

32-

ACCELERATED JUDGMENT

Lack of jurisdiction held waived where motion to vacate judgment
based thereon joined with defense on merits.
In a recent supreme court case, 201 the defendant moved to
vacate a judgment of foreclosure on two grounds: (1) that defendant was not served in the action and (2) that he had a
valid defense on the merits. The court held that the joinder of
the second ground, regarding the merits, constituted a waiver of the
first ground, regarding jurisdiction.
That would very likely have been the case under the CPA,
but it would appear to be an incorrect conclusion under the CPLR.
19s

12 App. Div. 2d 791, 209 N.Y.S2d 856 (2d Dep't 1961).

199 Similarly, a witness who resides, is employed or has an office, and a

non-resident witness who is served, employed or has a place of business
within New York City may have his deposition taken in any county within
New York City. CPLR 3110.
2003 WEIISTEIN, Koan & Miu.aR, NEW Yoiuc Civi PRAcricE I 3110.09
(1964).
201 Mutual Home Dealers Corp. v. Alves, - Misc. 2d -, 252 N.Y.S.2d 726
(Sup. Ct. 1964).
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Under CPA § 237-a, it was the clear policy of the law to require
that jurisdictional objections be taken by motion without any
other objection being joined. The joinder of any other objection
constituted a waiver of the jurisdictional objection.
That is not the case under the CPLR. CPLR 3211(e) not
only permits merits grounds to be joined on motions alleging
lack of jurisdiction; it makes clear that if the movant should
ever raise those merits grounds by way of a motion to dismiss
under 3211, he would have to join them with the jurisdictional
objection being moved on; only one 3211 motion is allowed.
Taking the intendment of the CPLR from the foregoing, and
applying it to a post-judgment motion to vacate a judgment, it
would appear quite satisfactory under the CPLR to join merits
grounds with jurisdictional grounds on the muotion to vacate the
judgment.
It was the policy of CPA § 237-a which would have justified the statement made in the Alves case under prior law. But
the case was handed dowi under present law, whose policy, as
indicated above, is decidedly different.
The matter became academic in Alves because, on the merits
ground, the defendant prevailed. But the point is an important
one. A defendant should not be precluded from joining merits
grounds in a motion to vacate a judgment for lack of jurisdiction.
The joinder amounts, in effect, to an alternative request that
the default be vacated and the defendant permitted to defend on
the merits. It accomplishes nothing, and only creates unnecessary
delay and expense, to require the defendant first to make a
motion to vacate on jurisdictional grounds and then, if that is
denied, to make an entirely new motion to open the default (offering
excuses for it) and secure leave to defend on the merits.
to dismiss denied where a strong
Failure to prosecute -Motion
meritorious case is established.
The appellate division of the first department in a per curiam
opinion2 0 2 upheld the special term which denied a motion. to dismiss
for failure to prosecute. The delay in the instant case was three
years. The appellate division admitted that the excuses for delay
were "weak" but pointed out that the affidavits of merit set forth
facts which, if proven, "establish a meritorious case." In light
of this, it would not reverse the special term's "exercise of
discretion."
Despite Sortino v. Fisher,20 3 cited by the court and the
cases which followed it in which the appellate division granted
202

Friedman v. Fortgand, 21 App. Div. 2d 779, 250 N.Y.S.2d.862 (1st
Dep't 1964).
20320 Aipp. Div. 2d 25, 245 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1st Dep't 1963).

cussion of Sortino, see 38 ST. JoHN's L. Rxv. 449 (1964).
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